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Foreword
The maritime victory off Tsushima in May 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War was
a milestone in modern naval history.  The victory marked the beginning of a new era
for the Imperial Japanese Navy.  It also manifested a theory among officers all over the
World of large vessels and giant guns as being the most important factors in naval
warfare, a view which permeated international naval thinking at the turn of the century.
The means applied and the results achieved in this decisive naval engagement paved
the way for this theory focusing on large ships and giant guns in Japan, and eventually
formed the foundation of the doctrinal core of the Imperial Navy and subsequently
ruled out any alternatives as means of securing victory at sea.
This paper seeks to answer the question of whether or not the development of the
Imperial Japanese Naval Air Wing, which began less than five years after the Japanese
defeat of Russia, was crippled by a doctrine based on experience gained in the golden
days of ships of the battle line.  First, the paper will examine the emergence of a
conventional Japanese naval battle doctrine, and subsequently answer the question of
why the Imperial Navy became a surface-oriented force, and how it planned to engage
an enemy and emerge victorious.  Second, looking at what factors promoted this
conventional doctrine, the paper will pose an answer to the question of why the surface
doctrine remained prominent and virtually unchallenged, and, subsequently, how
deeply this doctrine permeated officers of the naval air wing.
This paper cannot be exhaustive as David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie’s study of
Japanese naval air power, Sunburst.1) It will show that although the Imperial Japanese
Navy at a very early stage in the history of aviation began investigations into naval
aviation, constantly surveyed its international development, and eventually developed
an air wing that was probably the finest of its kind on the eve of the Pacific War, this
very force was at odds with a much more malignant foe than its counterparts of the
navies of the Allied Powers.  That enemy was the power of tradition which ruled within
the branch of the Japanese armed forces of which the air wing itself was a branch.
Evolution of a Doctrine
The theory that large ships and giant guns determined the outcome of naval battles
emerged in the final decades of a century that saw no large-scale engagements at sea
apart from Lord Nelson’s defeat of the French off Trafalgar on October 21, 1805, and
the Battle of Lissa on July 21, 1866, in the Adriatic Sea.  The accelerating development
in naval technology and the practices and theories of navies all over the world led to
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the idea that large, heavy fleets were the acme of sea power.  As this view gained
acceptance in well-established forces, it swiftly took on the appearance of a tradition.
Considering the novelty of the Imperial Japanese Navy as a military service in the late
nineteenth century, however, it could hardly be called an institution of tradition.
Tradition may be understood in the sense of organizational structure, institutional
conduct and other elements of an institution, and may be based on precedent and
established through experience accumulated over decades by successive generations of
officers and men as in, for example, the British Royal Navy.  It is therefore quite
interesting how a tradition of doctrine could emerge so swiftly in a force so relatively
new as the Imperial Japanese Navy.  The Japanese who established the Imperial Navy
were primarily trained by officers of the Royal Navy and were subsequently heavily
influenced by the doctrines of this tradition-bound force.  It is tempting to turn to these
foreign instructors to look for a doctrinal source.2) Yet, by the time an actual
formulation of battle doctrine was achieved in Japan, the Imperial Navy had
discharged most of the British and other foreign instructors.  Further, Japan became an
ally of Great Britain when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed on January 30,
1902.3) Thus, the emergence of a Japanese naval doctrine cannot be attributed to
British influence alone as independent doctrinal development began to accelerate only
after the Imperial Navy had seen victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.
The importance of sea power and the means to obtain it appeared in contemporary
writings by naval authorities such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, Philip Colomb, S.O.
Makarov, Julian S. Corbett, and others.4) The American captain, Mahan, who
published extensively on various aspects of naval history at the turn of the century, was
particularly popular in Japan, where his publications were even brought to the
attention of the Emperor.5) His writings were also read in navies around the world and
his view of sea power subsequently became internationally influential in the
development of battle doctrines.
According to Mahan, sea power was to be secured in a battle between heavily armed
forces to determine the superior party.  The victorious power, having achieved
supremacy at sea, would then intercept the mercantile marine of the defeated party and
through its annihilation blockade the enemy, forcing surrender.  Victory in the decisive
battle at sea became synonymous with victory in the war itself.6)
This perception of sea power and the means to obtain it, later known as Navalism,
caused the major naval powers to engage in an expensive race of naval construction.
This race was accelerated further by the call from servicemen in the maritime forces for
heavily armed and armored vessels as the means to comply with an evolving battle
doctrine emerging in the wake of Mahan.7) All over the world, naval officers
concentrated their efforts on this particular way of thinking under a single-minded trust
in the power of ships of the battle line ― or simply battleships.  This notion of large
ships and giant guns as the determining factors in a decisive engagement soon became
an international obsession and was considered the ultimate means for conducting naval
warfare.
In the Japanese case, a number of successive events linked by interrelated causes
contributed to the development of an especially strong belief in this doctrine.  Tactical
factors based upon battle experience that called for capital ships to guarantee victory in
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maritime engagement, and strategic factors based upon international incidents caused a
national cry for a grand navy.  That navy would be centered on a core of capital ships
to ensure national independence.  Those events fueled the development of a Mahanian
doctrine, as officers in the Imperial Navy pursued a perception of maritime supremacy
as necessary for the survival of Japan as an independent nation.  So thoroughly did the
doctrine permeate the Imperial Navy that during the first decades of the twentieth
century it became a de facto standard.  High-ranking officers converging under the
ensign of this standard considered other fields of naval technology as nothing more
than auxiliary means of achieving victory in the decisive battle.  Subsequently, they
refused to deviate from the standards of a grand navy composed of large ships
mounting giant guns, and thus paved the way for what was to be known as the ideology
of big ships and giant guns ― taikankyoho¯ shugi.8)
Tactical Factors
The battle experiences that were used to formulate the doctrine in the Japanese navy
were acquired primarily during the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War of
1904-1905.  The engagements in these conflicts became important in relation to each
other for the formulation of a doctrine as success in the former conflict laid down the
foundation of success in the latter.  Doctrinal theories deriving from victory in the Sino-
Japanese War seemed to be confirmed when Japan emerged victorious in the Russo-
Japanese War and would thenceforth remained unchallenged.
The first Sino-Japanese War saw but one large-scale engagement at sea.  This battle
occurred September 17, 1894, and is known in the West as the Battle of the Yalu.  In this
battle the Japanese Combined Fleet, though inferior in number as well as in guns,
succeeded in defeating the older and heterogeneous Chinese Northern Fleet by a
combination of homogeneously maneuverable vessels and efficient firepower and fire
control.9) The Japanese did not destroy the Chinese in the same absolute manner in
which they would annihilate the Russians in 1904.  However, owing to the victory and
the subsequent raids on the Chinese vessels that fled the scene and reached Chinese or
neutral ports, the Japanese achieved a Mahanian control of the sea in the region.  This
manner of victory impacted decisively the subsequent course of the war as the Japanese
could now intercept Chinese mercantile maritime traffic as well as troop transports at
will.
On February 5, 1904, the Imperial Navy was called upon again to defend the empire
in a conflict over regional interests with Russia when it received orders to attack
Russian shipping in the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan.  Again, the navy became an
important participant in a war that, like the first Sino-Japanese War, was fought
overseas.  Given that the main operations of this war also took place on the continent,
the important duty of securing sea-lanes and shepherding transports to the war theater
rested with the navy.  Though at high costs, the navy answered the call successfully and
engaged the Russian fleet deployed at Port Arthur and later the Baltic Fleet upon its
arrival at the scene in May 1905.  The successes resonated in the force for decades and
were projected as evidence that fast-moving heavily armed vessels and armored vessels
were the decisive factors for success in naval warfare.  Most commonly, the
annihilation of the Baltic Fleet off Tsushima on May 27-28, 1905, was brought forth at
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the Naval Staff College as an example of the origins of the Japanese naval doctrine and
served as a model for table-top exercises at this institution.  It is beyond doubt that the
destruction of the Russian force strengthened an existing view of the tactical
importance of supreme firepower.10)
However, other aspects of the maritime scenarios contributed to the notion of the
importance of superior firepower, too.  During much of the war, the Japanese navy
faced what Corbett referred to as “a fleet in being.”11) For Corbett, this meant a fleet
which though not actively seeking engagement poses a threat by its mere existence.  In
facing such a fleet the adversary must assign forces and financial resources which might
otherwise have been deployed differently to surveillance, with the objective of
eliminating the threat posed at any given opportunity.  Though the concept of a fleet in
being most properly falls under strategy and thus ought to be treated below, superior
firepower might have given the Japanese the tactical upper hand and allowed
destruction of the opponent at once, thus avoiding the exhaustive siege of the Russian
Pacific Squadron deployed at Port Arthur.  Until that squadron’s defeat in early
January 1905, the Russian vessels spent most of the time at port under the protection of
shore batteries.  The Russian navy limited the squadron’s operations to occasional
sorties in half-hearted attempts at engaging or harassing the Japanese or attempts of
escaping to Vladivostok.  The Japanese thus became acutely aware of the power of a
hostile fleet in being.
A third engagement that contributed to the Japanese perception of naval warfare was
the Battle of Jutland fought between the British Royal Navy and the German High Seas
Fleet on May 31-June 1, 1916.  A little more than a decade had passed since the Battle
of Tsushima, and naval aviation had been introduced in navies around the world.  The
utilization of aircraft in naval warfare had become an object of increasing research just
as had the construction of vessels to carry and tender naval aircraft.12) However, though
submarines and aircraft were available on both sides, the Battle of Jutland was
conducted in a conventional manner, as even the editors of the contemporary series
The Story of the Great War acknowledged.13)
Though used, torpedoes did not affect the outcome, and during the battle, the British
launched only one aircraft from a battle cruiser, and that merely for reconnaissance.
Thus, the damages suffered by both sides were caused mainly by conventional gunfire.14)
This two-dimensional battle, fought between the largest modern yet conventional fleets
that had ever met, would be the last of its kind.  Ironically, this battle did not give
either side the decisive victory under which it could claim a Mahanian control of the
sea.  The British suffered the heavier loss in personnel and material, but the
discouraged Germans abandoned their challenge to British supremacy at sea and were
content to remain a fleet in being for the rest of the war.
Though an ally of Great Britain, Japan played no active role in the Battle of Jutland.
But under the provisions of the alliance, a number of officers served as observers on
Royal Navy Ships and witnessed the battle.  Their experiences cannot be labeled battle
experience for the Imperial Navy itself.  However, their reports, information obtained
through the British Admiralty, news sources reporting on the war in general, and the
media publicity surrounding the death of Lieutenant Commander Shimomura
Chrsuke, who was killed when the cruiser Queen Mary blew up during the battle, all
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drew much attention in military and civilian circles Japan.15) Eventually, the outcome
of the engagement and the fact that the German navy had not been defeated but
continued to exist as a fleet in being strengthened the existing view among the Japanese
of the need to gain true victory in the decisive engagement.  Consequently, the Battle
of Jutland influenced a new outline for naval engagements known as “Decisive Fleet
Engagements” (艦隊決戦 Kantai Kessen) presented in October 1920 in “The Second
Revision of Battle Instructions for Warfare at Sea” (第二改正海戦要務令 Dai Ni Kaisei
Kaisen Ytmurei) compiled by the Navy General Staff.16)
Strategic Factors
One of the international events that caused a call for a grand navy in Japan took
place exactly one week after the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17,
1895, following the Japanese defeat of China.  Believing their position in China to be
threatened, Russia, France, and Germany moved additional forces into Asian waters in
the Triple Intervention, and on April 23, these three powers jointly advised Japan to
return to China the Liaodong Peninsula acquired under the treaty.  Isolated in the
international political arena, war-exhausted Japan yielded to the advice of the three
European powers.  This intervention caused much resentment in Japan.  Because of the
Japanese inability to respond to the European challenge, the Chief of Naval Affairs
Bureau, Admiral Yamamoto Gombei, drew up plans for a grand navy based on a core
of capital ships calculated to be strong enough to repulse any contemporary theoretical
maritime threat dispatched against Japan.17)
Though not following so quickly on the heels of victory as did the Triple Intervention
of 1895, third-party maneuvers in the post-Russo-Japanese War period likewise caused
anxiety in Japan and renewed the calls for a grand navy to secure national
independence. On December 16, 1907, the United States Navy dispatched its Grand
White Fleet, consisting of a core of sixteen new battleships, on a circumnavigation that
lasted until February 22, 1909.  During this tour, which was a show of the United
States’ naval power, the fleet called on, among other places, the port of Yokohama from
October 18 to October 25, 1908.  While the visit was supposedly set up to promote
friendly relations between the two nations, it took place in the wake of the ― from a
Japanese perspective ― inadequate American support in the post-war peace
negotiations, the San Francisco School Board Incident in October 1906, and the
Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907-1908, all of which had strained Japanese-American
relations and caused resentment in Japan.  This show of force was a not so subtle
reminder to the Japanese of the superior power of the United States.  That message was
delivered at a time when the national image of the enemy was changing.  The Imperial
Defence Policy (帝国国防方針 Teikoku Kokubt Htshin) of 1907 had designated the
United States as the Imperial Navy’s most likely future opponent.18)
Following World War I, the Washington Conference in 1921-1922 also nourished
the Japanese conviction of the strategic necessity of a strong navy.  This example of
external pressure, however, had a much more serious effect on the Japanese navy itself
than any of the previous external threats.  When invited to join this international
conference on disarmament, the Japanese government and naval authorities were
struggling with new plans for further naval construction, which had been passed by the
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Diet.  This proposal threatened to bankrupt the nation.  Nevertheless, some high
ranking officers of the navy, including  Vice Admiral Katt Kanji, felt that the
conference and its aims were not merely a threat to the navy but a threat to the nation
itself.19) The treaty signed at the conference subjected the Japanese navy to restrictions
imposed from abroad the 5:5:3 ratio in capital ships.  This treaty left Japan inferior to
its principal adversaries, the United States and Great Britain, who were both
apportioned a ratio of 5. 
These restrictions reinforced the Japanese faith that a navy centered on a strong core
of modern and qualitatively superior capital ships was a strategic necessity for national
security.  Likewise, the treaty’s restrictions strengthened the view of the importance of
the decisive maritime encounter within the Imperial Navy.  Any scenario other than
such an engagement in Japanese home waters would leave the numerically inferior
Imperial Navy at a disadvantage in a conflict with a power such as the United States.
In 1923, a revision of the Imperial Defense Policy designated the United States as
Japan’s primary potential enemy.  Japan would never be able to out-build, let alone
keep up with, the United States, which could redirect its unlimited resources to war
production in the event of a protracted conflict.  The decisive engagement thus became
an imperative.
Setting a Course
The Japanese development of a conventional doctrine revolving around a grand
navy composed of big vessels grew from experience earned at a time when
technological development made possible a realization of Mahan’s theory.  However,
the building of a grand navy considered ideal from a doctrinal standpoint was
constrained from across the sea even before it came to the drawing board.  The
Washington Treaty placed the decisive engagement in a new light and, consequently,
made success despite inferiority an imperative, leaving out other options for continuous
existence for the navy as well as for the nation in case of failure.  Subsequently, the
attention of the Japanese navy shifted from big vessels and big guns, which had become
axiomatic means for winning, to the decisive engagement itself in which these vessels
were ― as a matter of fact ― expected to take part.
What makes the doctrine interesting in relation to the Imperial Naval Air Force is
the way it dominated the rise of the air wing.  In 1903, Lieutenant Commander
Akiyama Saneyuki  lectured at the Naval Staff College in Tokyo on the influence on
naval warfare of the advances in aviation technology and the subsequent need to pay
attention to this development.20) In July 1909 the army and navy jointly established
The Provisional Committee for Research on Military Air Balloons (臨時軍用気球研究会
Rinji Gun’yt Kikyr Kenkyrkai), and in June 1912 the navy formed The Committee for
Naval Aeronautic Research (海軍航空術研究会 Kaigun Ktkrjutsu Kenkyrkai).21)
However, by this time, a doctrinal tradition that had its roots in the success of the Sino-
Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War was already gaining a foothold throughout
the entire Navy.  That a new concept within maritime warfare, evolving parallel to the
formulation of the surface doctrine, had potential for the future as promised by the
voices that spoke in favor of developing a strong air arm did not convince the
adherents of the new, conventional, doctrine that other courses had also to be
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considered.  Thus, aviation was, and remained, subordinate to a new tradition.
Challenging a Doctrine
Though the conventional doctrine took deep root within the Imperial Navy, an
awareness of the future possibilities of naval aviation also rose in the navy.
Conventional surface warfare research continued to receive priority funding and
manpower, but the Imperial Navy paid attention to international development in naval
aviation and aviation in general.  Aviation enthusiasts in the navy were marginalized
from decision-making officers, but nevertheless voiced their opinion in various ways
and in miscellaneous fora.  
The first to catch the attention of the naval command was Lieutenant Commander
Yamamoto Eisuke, who presented a written statement on aviation to his superiors in
March 1909.  Yamamoto’s statement and the further discussions with high ranking
officers the same year led the Imperial Navy to conduct  research on naval aviation,
send officers abroad for flight training, and gather information on aviation.22) A
contemporary of Yamamoto, Lieutenant Engineer Nakajima Chikuhei, a member of
the Committee for Naval Aeronautic Research, likewise filed a personal statement on
aviation in January 1914, prior to being sent to France to oversee the construction of
newly purchased aircraft and receive training.23) Whereas Yamamoto remained in the
Imperial Navy and in April 1927 was appointed chief of the Naval Aviation
Department, Nakajima retired in the summer of 1916 to engage fully in aeronautical
research.  He later founded the Nakajima Aeroplane Factory.24)
Another zealous enthusiast was Lieutenant Commander Isobe Tetsukichi.  He did
not merely voice his opinion, he also built his own aircraft and succeeded in flying it
eight months prior to the first official test flights of the Imperial Navy.  Isobe was
dispatched to China and later to Europe during World War I, where he and other
Japanese aviators saw action and suffered casualties at the Western Front.25) Injured
twice, once in a flight test accident at Tsingtao and later when shot down over Verdun,
Isobe wrote a book on aviation warfare entitled Sora no Ikusa upon returning to Japan
in 1918.  He foresaw the deleterious aerial bombardments of Japanese cities that would
take place approximately twenty-five years later.26) Ironically, Isobe had his book
endorsed with the calligraphy of the Imperial Navy officer who symbolized the faith in
the superiority of big ships and giant guns, Admiral Ttgt Heihachirt.
Aviation was also a reoccurring topic in the contemporary media.  As early as 1910
an article warning against the future prospects of aerial attacks on naval facilities and
vessels appeared under a pen name in the monthly periodical Kaigun.27) The naval
journal Yu¯shu¯ likewise carried numerous articles on aviation, and in 1929 a periodical
devoted entirely to naval aviation, Kaigun to Ko¯ku¯, appeared.  Like Isobe’s prophetic
publication, the first issue of Kaigun to Ko¯ku¯ also carried the calligraphy of Ttgt.  In
other words, the Imperial Navy was not blind to developments in aviation.  On the
contrary, it was attentive to the development in other navies in particular.  It sent
students abroad for aviation training and invited foreigners to Japan to teach the art of
aviation.  The question, then, is what impeded this new concept in naval warfare and
prevented it from achieving a strong foothold vis-à-vis the conventional doctrine of
large ships and giant guns in Japanese naval thinking.  Though not exhaustive, three
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closely interrelated causes, all important to the development of new technology,
disfavored the fledgling air wing and subsequently contributed to the power of the
conventional doctrine: the state of technology, the economy, and, perhaps most
important,  the human factor.
Technology
The technological state of naval aviation at the time when naval officers began
formulating a surface doctrine is important in considering its subordinate position
compared to conventional thinking.  The first launch of an aircraft from a ship took
place in the United States on November 14, 1910.  In Japan the first experiments in
naval aviation took place in early  November 1912, when the navy tested newly-
purchased Maurice Farman and Curtis float biplanes off Oppama in Kanagawa
Prefecture.  A few days later the same aircraft took part in the Naval Review off
Yokohama to show that the Imperial Navy was also introducing aviation. 
However, aviation as such and naval aviation in particular was still in its infancy and
the aircraft available were but light canvas-covered frames capable of only limited
speed, endurance, and payload.  Research and experiments did contribute to rapid
development, but the fragility and instability of contemporary aircraft, and especially
their dependency on weather conditions made it difficult for them to cooperate with
the surface force.  Consequently, the navy, which was already refining a doctrine that
had proved successful, saw little use for an air wing.  Except for an experimental
deployment of aircraft in a number of inconclusive assaults on German possessions at
Tsingtao between August and November 1914, aircraft were disregarded as offensive
let alone defensive weapons, and for many years were assigned observation or
reconnaissance tasks.  In the words of Okumiya Masatake,
…In those days no one would willingly let their own daughter board an air plane.
They were too fragile.  On the other hand, everybody knew the steadiness and
reliability of a war ship…28)
Thus, for almost two decades aviation enthusiasts within the Imperial Navy, who
praised the new technology’s potential for future naval warfare, were but rarae aves.
These men included Lieutenant Commander Genda Minoru, who was considered out
of line with the prevailing doctrine or at best decades ahead of his time while a student
at the Naval Academy, and Commander O¯nishi Takejirt, who later conceived the
aerial suicide attacks of World War II.  Both officers went so far as to claim that the
battleship was obsolete.29) Climbing the ladder of promotion was the heretic, Captain
Yamamoto Isoroku.  He had seen action in the Russo-Japanese War and been a
zealous student of naval gunnery, but changed his mind on heavy guns versus aircraft
while he studied a Harvard University.  Yamamoto was now firmly convinced of the
potential of naval air power.30)
The Washington Treaty forced the Imperial Navy to look for other means to close
the gap on its adversaries.  A result of this pressure was the carrier Ho¯sho¯ , which set the
navy’s initial course for carrier aviation.  However, not until full metal monoplanes
with better performance than their predecessors began to appear in the 1930s did the
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navy begin to seriously consider aviation as more than just an extension of observation
and reconnaissance.  The first aircraft to attract significant attention was the A5M2
fighter, which entered service with the Imperial Navy early in 1937 and was highly
successful in securing Japanese air supremacy over China after the outbreak of the
Second Sino-Japanese War on July 7 that same year.31)
The success of this aircraft created a new awareness of the potential of air power,
which increased when a new fighter, the A6M2 ― popularly known as the Zero fighter
― was accepted by the navy in July 1940 and out-performed any aircraft opposing it.
As a consequence of the success, an increase in the demand for aircraft occurred;
production doubled in a year.32) Though the initial successes were achieved over land,
the navy began to investigate how its air wing could be deployed to secure command
of the air at sea.  Eventually, these investigations provided the basis for the formulation
of a carrier doctrine and the creation of an offensive strike force, the First Air Fleet, in
April 1941.  This air fleet spearheaded the attack on Pearl Harbor eight months later.33)
However, the deployment of this new unit remained under the effective control of the
Navy General Staff, which remained the bastion of faith in the trinity of big ships, giant
guns, and the decisive encounter.34)
The Economy
Though aviation received attention, another factor, the economy, would influence its
further development, as first priority was still given to the construction of conventional
vessels by the time the air wing revealed the potential of air power.  In 1934, the
United States announced a massive modernization plan for its navy.  Feeling
threatened in a post-treaty world after the abrogation of the limitations in 1936, the
Japanese countered the American program with the Third Replenishment Program, to
begin in 1937.  Saturated by conventional thinking, this plan called for, along with
several other vessels of various categories, the construction of two super battleships of
the Yamato class.  It did, however, also include two carriers of the Sho¯kaku class
designed to work together with these battleships.  Hostilities with China hastened
implementation of elements of the program, and construction was well under way in
1938. 
However, that same year the Imperial Navy was taken aback when the United States
responded to a deteriorating international situation, aggravated for example by the
Japanese sinking of the U.S.S. Panay in China in December 1937, by announcing a 20
percent increase in tonnage in a second plan for naval expansion.35) To counter this
program, the Japanese Diet authorized the Fourth Replenishment Program, to begin as
early as 1939.  This time, however, the emphasis changed slightly, and though two
additional super battleships were authorized, aviation was given hitherto unseen
attention.  Where the Americans had announced plans for 1,000 aircraft, the Japanese
Navy, having finally realized the value of air power, countered with plans for more
than 1,500 aircraft along with a fleet carrier and six escort carriers.
As the hostile atmosphere between Japan and the United States intensified, and the
Japanese navy desperately tried to maintain its size relative to American force, the
demand for aircraft, as well as the demand for surface oriented construction,
encountered the insurmountable barrier of the limits of Japan’s industrial capacity.  The
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Third Replenishment Program and The Fourth Replenishment Program had severely
strained  the country’s shipbuilding industry, civilian as well as military, and as the
navy became entangled in the Pacific War, these strains reached unsustainable levels.36)
The reason was an increase in demands for changes in existing hardware that
arrived from the battlefield parallel to a continuous flow of demands for development
of new types of aircraft.  This pattern applied to the entire complex of shipyards and
aircraft factories and caused an enormous waste of industrial capacity given that
standards, which would allow an increase in productivity, were never allowed to settle.
In the case of shipping, the continuous demand for changes gradually created a navy of
assorted vessels built for specific tasks.  The aircraft industry saw a similar flow of
demands for changes, especially for the Zero fighter, which was considered the main
pillar of naval aviation.37) Eventually these demands took so much time that they
slowed the development of the next generation of fighters, subsequently creating a
vicious circle of increasing demands for improvements.38)
In addition, the aircraft entire industry also suffered in terms of shortages in
resources and production facilities.  Not only did the massive armament build-up
consume an enormous amount of resources, but when the United States imposed an
embargo on the export of scrap iron to Japan on September 26, 1940, Japanese aircraft
manufacturers found themselves short of supplies vital in aircraft production soon after
the newest fighter had been accepted and deployed.  The Fourth Replenishment
Program was indeed the first program in which the significance of naval aviation was
recognized.  In terms of shipping, however, this program still gave overall priority to
conventional construction, and the small number of carriers launched left carrier-borne
aviation subordinate to a core of capital ships, with little room to prove its worth and in
no position to challenge the supremacy of traditional thinking.
The Human Factor
Influencing and influenced by the factors mentioned above and equally important
for the development and integration of the naval air wing was a third factor, the human
factor.  Asada Sadao uses the terms “disarmament-faction” and “anti-disarmament-
faction” to describe two major groups emerging within the Imperial Navy due to the
Washington Treaty, each trying to affect the subsequent development of the navy.39)
The former group was, if only reluctantly so, in favor of the treaty, though it imposed
inferiority upon Japan in terms of vessels.  The latter group opposed the treaty.  A third
group, referred to by David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie as the “Gun Club,” may in
the context of this paper be considered a group of traditionalists in the sense that its
members, which were found in the two factions described by Asada, adhered to the
surface doctrine and the decisive encounter.40) Though it is an important aspect of the
power of institutional tradition, interpersonal relations and factionalism within the
Imperial Japanese Navy is a surprisingly neglected issue.41)
Of the two factions, the disarmament faction was the least aggressive.  It was,
however, never as united and never achieved institutional power similar to the anti-
disarmament faction.  It originally emerged around the head of the Japanese delegation
to Washington, Admiral Katt Tomosaburt, who died in August 1923 worn down by
fatigue and cancer accelerated by the exhausting negotiations in Washington.42)
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However, due to its disunited character by the time of his death, the faction never
developed a core and nobody replaced Katt Tomosaburt to rally these comparatively
moderate parts of the navy in opposition to the anti-disarmament faction.
Furthermore, the position of the moderates was made even more difficult by the
aggressive agitation from powerful extremists in the opposing faction, who even
resorted to assassination to further their course.43)
The anti-disarmament faction counted the largest number of adherents to the
doctrine of heavy artillery and decisive engagement and probably presented the biggest
single obstacle to the development of the air wing.  Centered on Vice-Admiral Katt
Kanji, a confirmed Mahanist, this faction caused the Japanese abandonment of the
naval treaties.  During his carrier, Katt Kanji held important positions, such as
headmaster of the Naval Artillery Academy and later of the Naval Staff College, which
allowed him to influence a significant number of rising officers.  Further, his
appointment as Vice-Chief of Staff in the year following the Washington negotiations
allowed him to influence the assignments of his former students.  He succeeded in
putting together a strongly Mahanian Navy General Staff that believed in Japan’s
sovereign right to build a navy to secure national independence and that such a navy
should be composed of big ships mounting giant guns.  This power base within the
Navy General Staff was maintained during the 1930s through retirements or
reassignments and subsequent promotions of officers loyal to the tradition.44)
Technological achievements in aeronautics did change the perception of aviation
among these traditionalists, but never undermined their confidence in heavy ships,
which suffused the negotiations for the third, fourth and even the fifth replenishment
programs.
Consequently, aviation in the Imperial Navy faced several obstacles both before and
even after its worth was recognized.  A web of highly influential factors such as those
mentioned above made it difficult for the air wing to get the credentials needed for
further expansion and development.  The naval air wing did achieve success that
redirected the attention of those in power, but not in time for it to develop into the
powerful naval air force that proponents hoped for.  The acknowledgement of the
potential of air power, the allocation of resources, and a break away from a traditional
way of thinking were all too late to establish an air force that could withstand a
protracted war against an enemy that on December 7, 1941, could muster 8,000 pilots
against 3,500 Japanese pilots.45)
Inside a New Force
Given a strong adherence to the surface doctrine in the Imperial navy, an obvious
question is whether or not doctrinal articles of faith, such as superior speed, fire power,
and quality, which collectively subordinated the air wing, were transmitted to the air
wing and worked against it from the inside as well.  That aviators of the Japanese Naval
Air Force were aviators in heart and soul is beyond doubt.46) However, the aviator
corps, the aircraft, and the strategies all show clear traces of the prevailing conventional
doctrine. 
In the case of the aviators themselves, a number of factors had a crucial impact on
the number of pilots serving in the naval air wing, and later disastrously affected the
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ability to counter growing aerial opposition as the Pacific War intensified.  First, aviator
experience was not a requirement to be assigned command of a carrier in the Imperial
Navy, and supposedly the only officer ever in command of a carrier, who had an
aviator’s education, was Yamamoto Isoroku.  He had taken flight training on his own
initiative when he served as second-in-command at Kasumigaura Air Group.47)
Consequently, officers had little urge for pursuing aviator skills since it did not enhance
their chances for being assigned a command and, furthermore, removed them from
more career enhancing “at sea” billets, should they choose to undergo flight training.
Combined with the second factor, that is, the recruitment of pilots being limited to
from within the service, there were annual difficulties in procuring the air wing a
sufficient number of pilots.  Still preferring quality over quantity, an obsession that
derived from the restrictions of the treaties, a new enrollment system allowing for
recruitment from outside the ranks of officers was introduced.  However, this being
equally rigid, only a limited number of prospective pilots were accepted for aviation
training on an annual basis, and even fewer graduated as aviators.48) Consequently, the
Imperial Navy opened the Pacific War with a corps of probably less than 600 well-
trained outstanding pilots, men who proved to be irreplaceable as the conflict began to
make incisions into the pilot body.  The system that had fostered these outstanding
pilots in an obsession with superior quality could not provide a sufficient quantity of
replacements. 
As for the aircraft, the Japanese navy had various types available at the opening of
the war, which likewise told a story of their own.  The Zero fighter is of particular
interest, as it had characteristics obviously traceable to the dominant thoughts in the
Imperial Navy.  When keeping in mind that a fighter was considered a defensive
aircraft as opposed to a bomber, the specifications for what would become the Zero
fighter as outlined by the Japanese navy in 1937 spelled out a contradiction when
considered in a contemporary technological context.49) The Zero fighter was to be a
highly maneuverable plane with superior speed and long range, and it was to be
capable of delivering the enemy a severe blow.  In other words, the Zero fighter was to
be a defensive aircraft ― an interceptor ― with the capabilities of an offensive aircraft
― an intruder ― true to the prevailing doctrine of the navy. 
A design team headed by Horikoshi Jirt at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Nagoya
created the Zero fighter.  This aircraft flew from victory to victory during the first
months after it entered service, and was superior to any of its contemporaries.
However, as the tide of war turned and the Japanese had to take the defensive, the
strategic shortcomings of the aircraft appeared.  Lack of armour, which had been
sacrificed to minimize weight, proved fatal to the pilots.  As the war progressed and
opposition grew stronger, a light but insufficiently powerful engine proved difficult to
replace without affecting performance significantly.  Further, the light construction of
the aircraft made it less resistant to the fire of increasingly heavy arms carried by
enemy aircraft.
In other words, the Zero fighters and the corps of aviators that manned them were
well prepared for and performed well in swift, offensive and decisive combat, in
accordance with the conventional, or traditional, doctrine of the Imperial Navy.
However, neither the plane nor the corps of pilot was capable of enduring a protracted
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war.  That war gradually exhausted the air wing as it did the surface force.
A Battle between the Past and the Future
The story of the gradual destruction of the Imperial Navy in the Pacific War is well
known and need not be recounted here.  Though both the Imperial Navy and its air
wing were well prepared when aircraft took off from the carriers early in the morning
of December 7, 1941, they were not prepared to fight an enemy that would respond
with inexhaustible power.  Years of practice and intensive studies based on successes of
the past had given rise to a strongly held belief in the Imperial Navy that a war could
be won by delivering the enemy one decisive blow.  However, in planning accordingly,
the Japanese prepared for battle, not for war.
To look into the future and predict what is needed to win future wars is beyond the
powers of any military force.  From this perspective the Imperial Navy’s plans for
attempting to outrange the enemy with heavy artillery like the guns carried by the
Yamato class battleship were justified in the light of their conception being based on
what was known and what was subsequently considered to be a logical development.
However, the survival of any military force, or any other given institution, must be
based on the ability of its leaders to judge the development and potential of the means
available, the strategies and tactics applied, and the very same leaders’ ability to
expeditiously adjust when necessary.  The aim of this paper has not been to suggest
that the outcome of the Pacific War would have been different had the Imperial
Japanese Navy challenged its own assumptions and departed on a new course in search
of alternative means.  However, the obstacles which the evolution of the naval air wing
encountered in Japan serves as an example of the unwillingness to depart from what is
known in favor of what is new.  
This phenomenon is not unique to the Imperial Japanese Navy in the early twentieth
century.  But the case of the naval air wing shows how conservative adherence to what
is known such as a surface doctrine in a navy, can obstruct progress, such as the rise of
an air wing.  Subordination of novelty, for example the development of the Imperial
Naval Air Force, may also be seen as the struggle for the survival of what is
conventional.  Failing to constrain new ideas that might prove superior to a given
conventional, or traditional, standard would render the said standard obsolete.  That
failure would consequently force adherents of the old ways to step down and leave the
rudder to the promoters of progress.
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